The Evolution of Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ Military Wing: An Analysis

This analysis explores the evolution of Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, from its inception in 1992 to its current status as a formidable military force in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Through a review of historical documents, memoirs of political and military leaders, and data on military confrontations, we examine the development of Hamas’ military capabilities, strategies, and their impact on regional and international dynamics. The findings highlight the significant role of military action in shaping the Palestinian national movement and underscore the necessity of understanding this evolution in the broader context of Middle Eastern politics.

The primary limitation of this paper is the availability and reliability of data, given the secretive nature of military organizations like Hamas. Additionally, the rapidly changing dynamics of the conflict pose challenges in maintaining up-to-date information. Despite these limitations, this paper aims to provide a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Hamas’ military wing.

The roots of the Palestinian Islamist movement can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. Following the 1948 occupation of Palestine, the Brotherhood’s activities in the West Bank and Gaza underwent several transformations, initially focusing on political advocacy and social services. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood’s military activities were limited and often faced suppression from various regional regimes.

In the early 1950s, the Brotherhood initiated limited military activities, but these efforts faced significant obstacles. The movement’s inability to organize substantial military actions was linked to its primary focus on social and political reforms. However, the defeat in the 1967 war created a sense of urgency, and the Brotherhood began to consider armed struggle as a necessary response to the occupation. The younger generation within the movement, influenced by the radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb, began to push for more active resistance, setting the stage for future military actions

From the 1948 war to the establishment of Fatah and the June 1967 war, however, there was no notable military activity by the Brotherhood itself against Israel either in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. There were only attempts by Palestinian Brotherhood members to reorganize their ranks led by a younger generation of leaders, foremost among whom were Abdullah Abu Azzah and Abdul Badi’ Sabir, who convened a meeting in the summer of 1962 in the Gaza Strip.

The June 1967 war came as a huge blow to all Arab political currents. Israel had come to occupy territory three times its previous size, taking over command of the Sinai, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.

In this post-defeat political climate, the Brotherhood began to consider military action and armed struggle against Israel. This soon became the overriding Brotherhood preoccupation at meetings all over the Arab World, with many calling for the establishment of independent Brotherhood military encampments in Jordan. At the same time, “classical” Brotherhood thought was dominant among the leadership and the base of the Palestinian Brotherhood itself, influencing the form that this military action took.

In 1967 the Brotherhood took its first steps towards military engagement against Israel. The Executive Office of the Brotherhood in Arab countries and Fatah (the PLO) agreed that the Jordanian Brotherhood would operate militarily as part of Fatah, with the Brotherhood at large procuring financial support from members in the Gulf. For a period, Brothers were trained at camps in Jerash, Azraq, and al-Alouk under commanders who included Abdullah Azzam. But this experiment was brought to a halt by the dramatic end of Palestinian military activity in Jordan in 1970.

All this coincided with the emergence of a new reformist-activist current among the younger members of the Brotherhood, a current which emphasized the concept of “practical” jihad and was deeply critical of the conduct of Brotherhood military activity under the existing leadership. Ibrahim Ghosheh (1936–2021), one of those young men, describes the “corrective movement” within the Brotherhood as a counter to mainstream Bannawi group-think: “now that the movement had expanded into Jordan, led by Tahsin Khreis among others, we wanted to address some of the negative points we’d noticed and to begin our project for jihad. We put out a secret internal newsletter focused on matters of organization and the groundwork required to get ready for jihad.” This internal and undeclared contingent of some one hundred young affiliates remained active until Black September in 1970. But the Brotherhood leadership in Jordan eventually became aware of the movement and suppressed it.

The activities of the Brotherhood in Palestine after 1967 were thus largely limited to advocacy work. It engaged in no significant military activity and had no independent military arm. Much of its effort was dedicated to coming up with intellectual justifications for not engaging in immediate armed resistance: the need for the construction of a “genuine foundation” strong enough to form a Muslim generation committed to the Islamic faith and prepared to make sacrifices on its behalf by creating a Muslim individual with an Islamic doctrinal education.

The inability of the Palestinian Brotherhood to organize military action between 1948 and 1967 was linked on one hand to the group’s self-definition as a political, economic, and social reform movement, and on the other hand, to its perceptions of the social and political structures through which it operated, with which it was very much at odds. The Islamist community in Palestine was dominated by a “hard core” which saw an overriding need for empowerment and preparation prior to undertaking any military action, as opposed to the younger, more impulsive generation which demanded immediate military action against Israel.

By the early 1980s, however, this younger contingent would come to have a profound impact on political and military action following a systematic review of the earlier generation’s principles. In other words, the generational struggle within the Islamist movement sheds important light on the context in which military action developed within Palestine’s Islamist movement.

Hamas’ military activities began with the establishment of the Islamist Resistance Movement during the First Intifada in 1987. Initially, the movement focused on mobilizing the masses and engaging in acts of civil disobedience against the Israeli occupation. The creation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 1992 marked a significant shift towards organized military action. Early operations included ambushes, kidnappings, and attacks on Israeli military targets. These activities were driven by the movement’s ideological commitment to armed resistance and the strategic need to assert its presence within the broader Palestinian resistance landscape.

The evolution of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades has significant implications for the Palestinian national movement and regional politics. The Brigades’ military capabilities and operational successes have enhanced Hamas’ political legitimacy and influence within the Palestinian territories. However, their activities have also contributed to the protraction of the conflict and heightened tensions with Israel. Regionally, Hamas’ military evolution has affected relationships with neighboring countries and influenced the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

The integration of Hamas into Palestinian society has been a multifaceted process. It has utilized social, educational, and religious institutions to embed itself within the community. Hamas has established a network of social services, including schools, healthcare facilities, and charitable organizations. These efforts have not only garnered widespread support but have also reinforced its ideological and political influence.

Hamas’ ability to provide essential services in the absence of a robust Palestinian Authority infrastructure has increased its popularity, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The movement’s investment in social welfare has been instrumental in maintaining grassroots support and legitimacy. This strategy underscores the importance of social services in the broader context of resistance movements and their political strategies.

The 1980s marked a significant period for the Palestinian Brotherhood as it began to institutionalize its military efforts. This era saw the formation of the Palestine Apparatus in 1985, which coordinated the movement’s activities and garnered financial support from abroad. Despite setbacks, such as the imprisonment of key leaders like Sheikh Ahmad Yasin following the first significant military operation in 1984, the movement continued to prepare for future confrontations. This period also saw the formation of the Organization for Jihad and Mission (MAJD), which handled security and intelligence operations, marking a transition from sporadic actions to a more organized and disciplined approach.

The institutionalization process involved covert operations aimed at identifying and neutralizing collaborators with the Israeli occupation. The creation of MAJD helped build a reliable cadre capable of conducting sustained military operations, laying the groundwork for the future establishment of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The increasing sophistication of these operations demonstrated a shift toward a more strategic and organized resistance.

Hamas was officially launched on December 14, 1987, amidst the First Intifada. The movement’s charter emphasized Islam as its guiding principle and declared the land of Palestine as an Islamic waqf (endowment). The early military actions of Hamas were conducted by its military command, known as the Palestinian Mujahidin, which later evolved into the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The first major operations involved the capture and execution of Israeli soldiers, which led to severe Israeli crackdowns and the imprisonment of many Hamas leaders.

By 1992, Hamas’s military operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were carried out under the name of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The Brigades established a more centralized military structure, forming cells and units across the territories. They received significant financial and logistical support from external sources, including donations from the Palestinian diaspora and regional allies like Iran and Syria. This support enabled the Brigades to procure weapons and conduct more sophisticated operations against Israeli targets.

The establishment of the Qassam Brigades marked a significant shift in Hamas’s strategy. The Brigades adopted a decentralized operational model, allowing for greater flexibility and security. This approach proved effective in sustaining military activities despite Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) efforts to dismantle the movement. The Brigades’ ability to adapt and innovate became a hallmark of Hamas’s military strategy.

The al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in 2000, marked a significant period of growth for the Qassam Brigades. Hamas rapidly rebuilt its military capabilities, benefiting from the release of key cadres from Palestinian Authority prisons and increased support from regional allies. The Brigades adopted a decentralized operational model, with autonomous cells conducting independent attacks. The movement’s growing military prowess and political influence eventually led to its electoral victory in 2006, further solidifying its role in the Palestinian resistance.

Hamas’s involvement in the political process presented new challenges. The need to balance governance and resistance led to tensions with the Palestinian Authority and internal divisions within the movement. However, Hamas’s commitment to armed struggle remained unwavering, and the Qassam Brigades continued to play a central role in the resistance against Israeli occupation.

Following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the Qassam Brigades transformed into a more sophisticated military organization. By 2008, they had established a structured military force with clear command hierarchies, specialized units, and extensive training programs. The establishment of a political office helped centralize control over military activities, although the Brigades maintained a degree of operational independence to ensure security and effectiveness. The ongoing conflict with Israel and internal Palestinian rivalries, particularly with Fatah, continued to shape the evolution of Hamas’s military strategy and organizational structure.

The integration of political and military roles allowed Hamas to leverage its governance in Gaza to support its military objectives. The Qassam Brigades benefited from the resources and infrastructure available in Gaza, including tunnels used for smuggling weapons and supplies. The political office also facilitated international diplomacy, securing support from regional allies and navigating the complex dynamics of Middle Eastern politics.

Then came 2007,and with the battle with fatah, played a significant role in shaping the evolution of Hamas and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This conflict, often referred to as the Battle of Gaza, resulted in Hamas forcefully seizing control of the Strip from Fatah. The Qassam Brigades showcased their military prowess against Fatah’s forces leading to their victory. This victory not only solidified Hamas’ control over Gaza but also showed Al-Qassam’s capability to conduct organized and strategic military operations. The battles with Fatah pushed Al-Qassam to further refine its military strategies and pushed Hamas to consolidate its governance structure, blending military and political efforts to maintain control over Gaza.

The battle with Fatah also highlighted the ideological and tactical distinctions between the two groups. While Fatah focused on “diplomatic” efforts through the Palestinian Authority giving Israel whatever they want, Hamas, through the Qassam Brigades, emphasized armed resistance. This ideological divide deepened after 2007, with Hamas investing heavily in its military wing to both defend against the occupation’s incursions and maintain internal security in Gaza. The fight highlighted the necessity for Hamas to develop a robust military apparatus not only to fight off the occupation, but also to ensure its dominance over rival Palestinian factions.

Then came the major confrontation with Israel in December 2008, known as Operation Cast Lead, which was a significant test for the Qassam Brigades. Launched by Israel in response to rocket fire from Gaza, it involved a massive military assault aimed at crippling Hamas’ infrastructure and military capabilities. This lasted for three weeks, resulting in widespread destruction and significant casualties in Gaza. But even with the deaths of over 1.4 thousand Palestinians and the destruction of important facilities, Al-Qassam was able to maintain their operational capabilities and continue their resistance efforts.

Throughout this conflict, the Qassam Brigades employed a range of tactics that demonstrated their growing sophistication and strategic thinking. They also showed the importance of a decentralized command structure, even when important leaders were targeted, the brigades were able to continue their operations without interruption. The ability to sustain resistance under such harsh conditions bolstered Hamas’ reputation within Gaza and among its supporters.

Then came the infamous 2014 War, dubbed Operation Protective Edge by the Israelis. One of the most notable innovations debuted by Al-Qassam during this war was the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both reconnaissance and offensive operations. The use of drones was a huge technological leap for Al-Qassam, allowing them to gather intelligence on Israeli positions and even to attack strategic targets. This showed the Al-Qassam’s increasing technological sophistication and their ability to integrate modern warfare techniques as soon as they get the chance.

Another distinctive aspect of the 2014 war was the use of tunnel networks, which played a crucial role in Al-Qassam’s defensive and offensive strategies. These tunnels, some of which extend into the occupied territories (Israel), were used for surprise attacks, weapon smuggling, and movement of fighters, effectively neutralizing some of the occupation force’s advantages. The tunnels allowed the Qassam Brigades to conduct ambushes and infiltrations behind Israeli lines, causing significant disruptions to Israeli military operations, prompting Israel to invest heavily in tunnel detection technologies post-war. This shift in tactics influenced Al-Qassam’s future operational planning, cementing tunneling as a crucial component of their military doctrine.

Now we fast forward to 2021,on May 10, 2021, at 6 PM, historic moments unfolded in the heart of Jerusalem. Warning sirens blared, and resistance rockets launched from Gaza toward Jerusalem following a threat by Mohammed Deif, the Chief of Staff of the Qassam Brigades. The bombardment was a response to unprecedented escalation in Israeli assaults within occupied Jerusalem, including provocative incursions by Israeli settlers into the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, violent actions by occupation forces, and the forced evictions of Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah.

This event surprised the Israeli government, but more importantly, it caught the military establishment off guard, as they were unprepared for such an event. The two surprising aspects were the actual firing toward Jerusalem and the military intelligence’s failure to read Hamas’s intentions. The government expected Hamas to act, but not in such a dramatic way as happened on the second day of the war during the flag march at 6 PM. From this angle, perhaps Israel understood that Hamas would take action, but they did not grasp the full extent of what Hamas pushed forward.

In response to the resistance’s surprise strikes, Israel retaliated by bombing civilians and demolishing residential towers in Gaza. The result was the martyrdom of dozens of civilians, many of them children, within days of the intense Israeli bombardment, which continued throughout the war. With the escalation of this bombardment, the resistance expanded its targets, issuing another warning to the occupation. They made it clear that if Israel targeted civilian buildings and homes in Gaza, their response would be powerful and beyond Israel’s expectations.

In executing this warning, the resistance delivered a historic blow, targeting Tel Aviv from the first day of the battle to shatter the hub of arrogance and aggression, establishing a new equation. Striking Tel Aviv became easier than drinking water. This command center, located underground, directed missile strikes throughout the conflict, including unprecedented salvos that hit deep into Tel Aviv. The artillery unit was preparing a barrage of 130 rockets towards Tel Aviv, awaiting orders from the leadership. This strike was executed upon receiving the command.

Abu Obeidah, the spokesperson for the Qassam Brigades, outlined the final phase of the battle known to Palestinians as the “Sword of Jerusalem” and to Israelis as “Operation Guardian of the Walls.” The hours passed quietly, and the ceasefire between the resistance and Israel took effect, leaving the threatened strike from the Qassam Brigades unexecuted. For the first time, the Qassam Brigades revealed details of the final strike they had planned.

It involved 362 rockets aimed at fourteen cities and settlements, including Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Beersheba, Haifa, Eilat, Jerusalem, Dimona, Herzliya, Netanya, Hadera, Netivot, Afkim, and Sderot. Although this strike did not occur, the war itself marked a historic shift and left an unprecedented impact on the history of the conflict with the occupation .

The resistance’s actions in this conflict were far more complex and organized than previous engagements. Previously, they launched improvised rockets, but now they were an organized resistance targeting Israel with different calibers, sizes, and ranges of rockets. Israeli settlements and villages surrounding Gaza, once fortified against such attacks, were now exposed. Throughout the ten-day conflict, over 4,300 projectiles were launched from Gaza, matching the volume fired during the 2014 war in Operation Protective Edge. The intensive and simultaneous launch of rockets towards central Israel was a notable aspect of this war.

Hamas succeeded in leveraging media to instill fear and anxiety among Israeli citizens, using direct warnings and threats to close Tel Aviv. This media strategy had a significant psychological impact, as evidenced by videos and surveillance footage showing the aftermath of rocket strikes and other military actions.

Direct warnings and threats, coupled with the use of media to broadcast the aftermath of rocket strikes and other military actions, have been effective in shaping the psychological landscape of the conflict. This strategy reflects Hamas’s deep understanding of Israeli public psychology and their ability to use media as a tool of warfare.

Intelligence operations and external support have played crucial roles in the ongoing conflict. Hamas’s ability to anticipate and counter Israeli plans has been bolstered by a comprehensive security network that includes support from regional allies such as HezboAllah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. This network has provided valuable intelligence and operational support, enabling Hamas to maintain readiness and counter Israeli operations effectively.

The joint security operations room, which includes officers from the Qassam Brigades and regional allies, has been instrumental in coordinating responses and leveraging external support to enhance Hamas’s operational capabilities. This collaboration underscores the regional dimensions of the conflict and the complex web of alliances and rivalries that influence its dynamics.

As circumstances on the ground for Palestinians deteriorated dramatically, several factors contributed to the launch of Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023. Israeli leaders were clear in their opposition to Palestinian statehood. Settlements expanded, and extremist settlers were empowered to go on violent rampages. Human rights organizations globally denounced Israel as an apartheid state, while Gaza’s population sunk deeper into poverty. The entry of openly racist officials into senior Israeli government positions exacerbated tensions. Despite these alarming conditions, the West remained largely uninterested, and even complicit.

The Abraham Accords played a pivotal role in this context. Normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel, without progress toward ending the occupation or settling the Palestinian issue, suggested that Palestinians were increasingly isolated. The prospect of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia further underscored this isolation. Every indication was that Israel was successfully managing its occupation, having largely quelled threats from the West Bank and confined Hamas to Gaza through a combination of cash inflows from Qatar and limited work permits.

Al-Aqsa Flood was months in the making and conducted with utmost secrecy. Even Hamas’ political leaders were unaware of the specifics. The operation utilized drones to knock out surveillance cameras and employed diversionary tactics such as rocket fire and motorized paragliders to breach the “smart wall” Israel had erected around Gaza.

The initial targets were clear: Hamas fighters attacked several military bases around Gaza, killing and capturing soldiers to exchange for Palestinian prisoners. However, the Israeli military response was unexpectedly slow, allowing other resistance groups to stream across the boundary.

Now, 9 months later, Since the initiation of Al-Aqsa Flood,despite the relentless bombardment and tightening blockade, the Qassam Brigades and other resistance groups have shown remarkable resilience. The ability of the resistance to sustain its operations under such conditions is a testament to its organizational capabilities and the determination of its fighters.

The prolonged conflict has seen Hamas continually adapt its tactics and strategies. Even under intense siege, the Qassam Brigades have managed to launch significant operations. This includes the defense of strategic locations and conducting surprise attacks on Israeli forces, demonstrating sophisticated use of technology and guerrilla warfare tactics.

Israeli forces have encountered substantial resistance, resulting in significant casualties and strategic setbacks. This highlights the capacity of the Qassam Brigades to inflict damage on Israeli military units despite the inhumane conditions in Gaza

Al-Qassam employs guerrilla tactics, including ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. These methods rely on surprise and mobility, making them difficult for conventional military forces to counter. By targeting vulnerable points and retreating quickly, Al-Qassam can inflict damage while minimizing its own losses. Fighters often set up ambushes along known patrol routes or predict Israeli movements to lure them into traps, using small arms fire, RPGs, and other portable weaponry.

IEDs play a crucial role in Al-Qassam’s strategy. These devices are cost-effective and can cause substantial damage to both personnel and equipment, creating a persistent threat that conventional armies find hard to mitigate. Al-Qassam uses a range of IEDs, from roadside bombs to explosive-laden vehicles. These can be triggered remotely, by pressure, or by vehicle motion, significantly impacting the operational effectiveness of Israeli forces.

Hamas has invested heavily in developing an extensive network of tunnels throughout Gaza. These tunnels serve multiple purposes, from smuggling goods and arms to facilitating surprise attacks on Israeli forces. Constructed using reinforced concrete and equipped with electricity and ventilation systems, the tunnels are maintained continuously to ensure operational readiness.

Tunnels provide Al-Qassam with the ability to move fighters and weapons undetected. They also serve as storage sites and operational bases, offering significant strategic advantages by allowing surprise attacks and evasion of Israeli surveillance. The tunnels enable Qassam fighters to launch attacks behind Israeli lines, catching forces off guard and providing escape routes to avoid capture.

Despite Israel’s attempts to develop technologies and methods to detect and destroy these tunnels, the complexity and depth of the networks present significant challenges. The interconnected nature of the tunnels allows multiple sections to remain operational even if parts are compromised, making it difficult for Israeli forces to make substantial dents in Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure.

Urban warfare presents unique challenges for conventional military forces. Buildings, narrow streets, and dense populations create a complex and unpredictable combat environment. Fighting in urban areas neutralizes some of the technological and firepower superiority of the IDF. The close-quarters combat and familiar terrain give Qassam fighters an edge, allowing them to utilize hit-and-run tactics effectively.

Local support within Gaza is crucial for Hamas. This support provides the organization with essential resources, including intelligence, logistics, and recruitment. Hamas integrates itself into the local community, fostering support through social services and ideological alignment. This ensures a steady flow of supplies, including food, medical supplies, and building materials for tunnels and rockets.

Hamas engages in psychological warfare to maintain morale among its fighters and supporters. This includes the strategic use of propaganda to bolster resolve and commitment. Videos, social media posts, and publications highlight successes and valorize fighters, strengthening resolve and deepening ideological commitment.

Propaganda and psychological operations are also aimed at the Israeli population and military. By projecting strength and resilience, Hamas attempts to erode the will of its adversaries. High-profile attacks aim to instill fear and demonstrate vulnerability within Israeli society, creating public pressure on the Israeli government.

Al-Qassam has shown a remarkable ability to adapt its strategies and tactics based on evolving battlefield dynamics. This flexibility allows it to counter Israeli operations effectively. Post-operation analyses help refine strategies and tactics for future engagements.

Hamas has developed significant domestic weapons manufacturing capabilities, allowing it to produce a range of weaponry independently. This self-sufficiency reduces reliance on external supplies and enables continuous replenishment of its arsenal. Utilizing locally available materials, Hamas manufactures a variety of weapons, tailored to its strategic needs and operational environment.

Continuous improvements in rocket designs and tunnel construction techniques demonstrate Hamas’s commitment to enhancing its operational capabilities. These innovations make their tactics more effective and harder to counter. Improved accuracy, range, and payloads increase the threat posed by Hamas’s rocket arsenal, while enhanced construction techniques make tunnels more resilient and harder to detect.

The Yasin-105, a tandem-charge anti-tank rocket, is a significant development by Hamas. It is designed to penetrate heavy armor and has been effective against Israeli Merkava tanks. The rocket consists of a dual destructive head with two charges, breaching outer armor and penetrating steel to explode inside the target.

The Shuath explosive is an IED designed to target armored vehicles and tanks. Used in ambushes and direct confrontations, it has been effective in destroying Israeli military assets, including Merkava-4 tanks and D-9 bulldozers.

The Ghoul 14.5mm anti-materiel rifle, developed by Al-Qassam named after Adnan Al-Ghoul (the founder of the domestic weapon manufacturing program), is designed for long-range engagements with significant anti-materiel capabilities. It has been used effectively against Israeli military personnel and equipment.

The al-Qassam Brigades have been involved in several many major military confrontations with Israeli forces including Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), and Operation Protective Edge (2014). These confrontations have also been full of intense urban warfare, rocket attacks on Israeli cities, and significant civilian casualties in Gaza.

One of the most notable aspects of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ evolution has been their ability to acquire and develop advanced military technology. This includes the production of homemade rockets, the construction of an extensive tunnel network, and the use of drones for reconnaissance and attacks. These technological advancements have enabled the Brigades to enhance their operational capabilities and sustain prolonged engagements with Israeli forces. The integration of these technologies into their military strategies reflects a sophisticated understanding of modern warfare and a commitment to continuous improvement.

The evolution of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades from a loosely organized militant group to a formidable military force is a testament to Hamas’ strategic acumen and adaptability. The Brigades’ ability to sustain prolonged military engagements, develop advanced technologies, and maintain popular support highlights their significant role in the Palestinian liberation movement